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One of the leading characteristics of our current era is the speed of change. This can
also best describe the status quo of today's telecommunications industry.
In view of the increasing importance of propelling prosperity and development, the world
has witnessed a wave of liberalization and competition enhancement in the telecommuni-
cations industry in many countries over the last decade. The recipe for reform recom-
mended by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is privatization, competi-
tion and independent regulation;' but the experimental results have varied greatly.' As one
of the notable examples,, China has not only developed into the second largest telecom-
munications network in the world, but has also offered its own experience and lessons to
the telecom industries of other emerging economies.
While the developing rate of the telecommunications market in China may be remarkably
fast, another noteworthy fact is that those dramatic figures have all been achieved within a
rather short time period (about ten years) and under a unique route: gradual reform with
Chinese characteristics.
By reviewing the developmental history of the telecommunications industry in China,
this article seeks to analyze the basic characteristics of the regulation and competition in
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Telecoms (Mar. 2002), available at http://www.itu.int/itunews/issue/2002/03/policy.html [hereinafter Rein-
venting Telecomsl.
2. Id., Table 1-Winners and losers.
3. Ministry of Information Industry, China, Latest statistics (Apr. 2002), available at http://www.mii.gov.cn/
mii/hyzw/tongji/yb/tongjiziliao2002O3.htm [hereinafter Statistics]. By the end ofMarch 2002, exchange capacity
of the whole country had reached 201 million lines and mobile switching capacity to 235 million; the total
telephone subscribers had grown to 350 million, with 188 million fixed users and 162 million mobile users,
making China's telecommunications network the largest one in the world, in terms of its size and subscribers.
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this specific sector, and to analyze certain essential factors that will greatly affect the new
perspective of competition in the post-WTO epoch in China. The relevant agreements
and documents of the WNTO as well as the commitments that China has made to other
WNTO member countries will also be examined to facilitate the discussion.
I. Review of the Developmental Stages and Competition
Patterns in the Chinese Telecommunications Industry
A. THE HIGHLY PLANNED AND MONOPOLIZED STAGE (1949-1979)
Before China adopted an Open Door policy and began its economic reform, the basic
structure of Chinese telecommunications was a highly planned, directed governmental mo-
nopoly by the former Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT). Natural monopoly4
is the basic characteristic at this stage. Because of the strict controls on telecommunications
tariffs and prices by the government, the entire industry basically made no profit and was
in a constantly losing financial status. Inadequate telecommunications infrastructure and
services were among the bottlenecks that limited economic growth.
B. LOOSENING CONTROLS ON PRICE AND THE BEGINNING OF RAPID DEVELOPMENT
(1979-1993)
The administrative system reform in telecommunications started alongside with reforms
in many other sectors in 1979. The government began to loosen controls over the prices
and fees for telecommunications, and allowed China Telecom Corporation (then the sole
market player and directly under MTP) to levy an installation fee on subscribers of fixed
telephones. This preferential policy had a tremendous leveraging effect and the telecom-
munications industry has since been on the fast track of development.
From 1979 to 1995, about one third of the total investment in fixed assets of the tele-
communications sector (amounting to approximately U.S.$3 3 billion) was attributed to the
collected installation fee, according to China Telecom's annual report.' However, rapid
development did not touch the foundation of the failures of the system. The administrative
monopoly and lack of competition that resulted from a combination of the administration,
regulation, management, and operation of the Chinese telecommunications industry
spurred massive public complaint over the poor service and high prices in this sector.
C. PRELIMINARY BREAK UP OF THE MONOPOLY AND INTRODUCTION OF COMPETITION
(1994-1998)
In 1994, the second telecommunications carrier, China United Telecommunication
Company, Ltd. (China Unicom) was established.' This was an ice-breaking event for the
long monopolized domestic telecommunications market. The designed duopoly improved
4. Mark Armstrong, Telecommunication, in COMPETITION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 134 (Dieter Helm &
Tim Jenkinson eds., 1998).
5. Xiaofeng Liu, The Installation Fee Contributed Greatly to China Telecom, CHINA MANAGEMENT DAILY,
July 14, 2001.
6. China Uninet, Introduction to China Uninet, available at http://www.cnuninet.com/uninet/homepage/
aboutus.jsp.
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the efficiency and services in the basic telecommunications market to some extent; and, in
the areas in which Unicom has entered the MPT has reduced its tariffs and prices, consid-
erably. This duopoly market was similar to that in the United Kingdom from 1982 to
1996.7 However, both of these markets have moved further in deregulation so as to enhance
the competition.
D. INSTITUTIONAL RESTRUCTURING (I 999-2 001)
At this stage, the reform was preceded by two trends. In March 1998, the Ministry of
Information Industry (MII) was established on the basis of the former Ministry of Electronic
Industry and the MPT, and hence separation between the administrative function and the
operational function became practical.
Consequently, in February 1999, Mil restructured the whole industry by breaking China
Telecom into four smaller companies: China Telecom, China Mobile, ChinaSat and Guoxin
Paging." For the purpose of strengthening competition, telecommunications service licenses
were granted to three more governmental companies: China Network Communication
Group, China Jitong Communication Co. and China Railway Telecommunication Cor-
poration. Adding the existing China Unicom, the number of nationwide basic telecom-
munications operators increased to seven and a basic pattern of competition was formed at
different levels.
E. LATEST "NORTH-SOUTH" SPLITTING (DECEMBER 2001)
The rapid development and the government's constant endeavors to increase the number
of market players did not lead to adequate competition as anticipated. The total market
share of all the other service carriers was still remarkably low when compared with the
dominant share of China Telecom (see the below figure9). A typical "Market Failure"1°
could be seen where market forces and competition had been nullified or distorted. A
monopoly still existed in some areas. For example, China Telecom still monopolized the
international market, China Mobile occupied most of the market share of the GSM net-
work, and China Unicom tended to monopolize the CDMA project.
Facing the mounting pressure of potential competition with the market opening to for-
eign investment and giant multinationals, the Chinese government approved the latest re-
structuring plan of the industry. The government divided China Telecom into two tele-
communications groups by regions, north and south, on December 11, 2001. On the same
day China formally entered into the WTO." The north China Telecom (including ten
7. Armstrong, supra note 4, at 139-140.
8. Ministry of Information Industry, China, Memorabilia of Reform and Opening to the outside World of Tele-
communications Industry of China, available at http://www.mii.gov.cn/Mii/homepage.nsf/documentview/2001-
01-20-03-DA25408DFF1 CD39D482569DA00268F83?OpenDocument.
9. Ministry of Information Industry, China, Annual Report of Development of Telecommunication Induttry: 2001,
available at http://www.mii.gov.cn/mii/hyzw/2001tongjigongbao.htm. In terms of this report, market share is cal-
culated on the basis of annual business income of leading telecommunications service carriers of China.
10. LAN WALDEN & JOHN ANGEL, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND REGULATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 266
(2001).
11. Wang Yong & Liu Qiankun, A Thorough Review of the Splitting of China Telecom, THE ECONOMIC OB-
SERVER, Dec. 17, 2001, at 36, available at http://www.eobserver.com.cn/ReadNews.asp?NewsID = 139.
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provinces and cities, roughly 30 percent of the old China Telecom's national backbone
network) merged with Netcom and Jitong and was named China Netcom Group Corpo-
ration. The south China Telecom (including twenty-one provinces and cities) retained the
brand name. Both companies were allowed to build a local telephone network and operate
local fixed-line services, and each would provide equal and fair interconnection to the other.2
Officially, this breakup was regarded as "a signal of further opening up to the world,"
and was targeted at increasing the chances for Chinese telecom operators to be listed over-
seas, thereby elevating the competition to a higher level."3 But comments from both do-
mestic and overseas observers are controversial. Whether the split improved the level of
competition between firms of comparable size and capacity is still questionable.
In addition, several other important factors should be considered in developing the ex-
isting competition pattern and its prospects.
1. Lack of Statutosy Law of Regulation and Competition
Through the above developmental history, we find that the basic principle the Chinese
government has adopted was to break up the monopoly and foster more competition. How-
ever, the regulating authority concentrated more on the former and ignored the need to
design a complete set of rules governing competition. The lack of fair rules of competition
resulted in inefficient, improper and insufficient competition. "Pricing Wars" was the only
form of competition that occurred in many places between the duopoly of China Telecom
and Unicom.
In the meantime, industry regulation was generally in the form of governmental policies
or documents instead of in the form of statute or law, resulting in an unstable and less-
binding system of regulation.
The revised law on telecommunications has been discussed for approximately eight years.
Unfortunately, it still has yet to be implemented. It was not until September 25, 2000, that
the Regulations on Telecommunications of the People's Republic of China were promul-
gated.' 4 The Administrative Methods of Internet Services, a basic telecommunications reg-
ulatory rule, was then created and the development of the telecommunications and indus-
trial administration made progress toward being more compliant.'5
2. Limited Source of Investment
During this time period, most of the telecommunications operators were state-owned
enterprises or state-held undertakings. Only an insignificant amount of foreign investment
had been made in the newly approved carriers, like Unicorn and Netcom, by bypassing the
relevant regulations; and, future investments of this type were publicly prohibited. Addi-
tionally, the government still strictly restricted international and private investment in basic
telecommunications infrastructure and service.
Thus, there was no valid and intense competition in the Chinese telecommunications
market, despite the constant efforts of the government, rounds of restructuring in the sector,
12. Liu Baijia, Telecom Monopoly Set to Split, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 12, 2001.
13. Id.
14. State Council of the P.R. China, Regulations on Telecommunications of the People's Republic of China, pro-
mulgated and effected on September 25, 2000, available at http://www.mii.gov.cn/mii/hyzw/hygl/dxtl.htm.
15. State Council of the P. R. China, Administrative Methods of Internet Services, promulgated and effected
on September 25, 2000, available at http://www.mii.gov.cn/mii/hyzw/hygl/hlwxx.htm.
VOL. 36, No. 4
A CHALLENGE TO EMERGING ECONOMIES 1177
and the numerous operators in that market. This is another economic phenomenon with
Chinese characteristics.
3. Non-Independence of The Market Regulator: MPT and MII
MPT and its successor, MII, as well as their provincial branches, are the primary regu-
lators and policymakers for the telecommunications sector at their respective levels; how-
ever, the same entities are the dominant service providers in the sector at the same time.
Although MPT and MII had separated the functions of policy-making or regulation and
operation into different departments, there was still a close financial and administrative
connection between the government and the operators. It was difficult to regard MPT and
MII themselves as independent, and 16 the existing domestic competitors complained loudly
that MPT was both player and referee, and did not exact impartial treatment.
Actually, this characteristic was not confined to the telecommunications sector, but oc-
curred in many other economic areas like civil aviation, railway transportation, petroleum
and gas, because of the existing political and administration system in China. The impact
of entering the VTO on this unresponsive and obsolete administrative system will be
reviewed in the third part of this article.
I. WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications and
China's Commitments
On February 15, 1997, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 7 and its
Annex on Telecommunications"s of the WTO concluded the negotiations on basic tele-
communications services. Sixty-nine governments comprising more than 91 percent of
global telecommunications revenues made commitments to open up their respective tele-
communications markets beginning in January 1998. These commitments involved three
basic areas: (1) market access, (2) foreign investment, and (3) acceptance of certain regu-
latory principles intended to make market openings meaningful. 19
The following VTO rules that were established in the GATS and its annexes reflected
some of the basic principles in the development of the telecommunications sector.
A. MOST-FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT (MFN)2 °
Consistent with GATT, MFN is firmly established as a universal rule for all service
sectors, and should be committed to by all members. According to MFN, the members
should treat all other members equally in telecommunications market access.
B. "NoN-DIsCRIMINATORY" PRINCIPLE2'
Stipulated in the Annex on Telecommunications (AT), this principle ensures "access to
and use of public telecommunications transport networks and services"
16. Yong & Qiankun, supra note 11, at 10. Actually they belong to the fourth model of regulatory author-
ities-a government ministry-that is distinguished in Walden.
17. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex I B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -RESULTS OF THE URU-
OUAY RoUND vol. 33, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
18. Id. at 1192.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1169.
21. Id. at 1194.
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C. MARKET AccEss, NATIONAL TREATMENT, AND ADDITIONAL COMMITMENTS 22
For market access, the members should clearly indicate any limitations in their telecom-
munications services (basic and value-added).23 The GATS also prohibits the members from
discriminating against foreign telecommunications service providers as compared with their
domestic counterparts in terms of national treatment.24 Some other important regulatory
commitments aimed at creating a competition-oriented, independent and transparent reg-
ulatory institution were concluded in the Reference Paper.25 Committed to by sixty-eight
members in 1998, the Reference Paper laid out six guiding principles for the members in
redesigning their domestic telecommunications regulatory institutions. These principles
are: (1) competitive safeguards, (2) interconnection, (3) universal service, (4) public avail-
ability of licensing criteria, (5) independent regulation, and (6) allocation and use of scarce
resources.26 Some of these items, which would considerably affect the potential competition
patterns, will be discussed in the third part of this article.
The above listed fundamental principles reflect that the diverse representatives that ne-
gotiated the Agreement realized that monopolies enjoying structural advantages in the tele-
communications market could nullify or minimize competition effectively. China could be
an example of such a minimization. Therefore, in addition to the imperative step of opening
markets, certain other aspects of the regulatory environment have to be designed and im-
plemented as well, in order to make competition effective.
The most significant and material concessions that China made during the negotiations
for accession to the 'AFO were reflected in the bilateral agreement between the United
States and China, which was signed on November 15, 1999, following thirteen years of
tough bargaining.27 According to this Agreement, foreign firms in the telecommunications
industry will be allowed to have up to 49 percent ownership upon China's accession to
VATO. The ceiling for foreign ownership would be raised to 50 percent in the second year
after accession.26 In addition, China will end all geographic restrictions for paging, Internet
service, mobile, voice, and data services within the country. Foreigners may invest in Chi-
nese Internet businesses and own up to 50 percent of Chinese telecom ventures in two
years.29 Taking into consideration the universal MFN and the non-discriminatory principles
of the WTO, the telecommunications industry in China, which has traditionally been
tightly controlled and carefully shielded, will finally be opened and exposed to genuine
foreign competition.
That this Agreement was concluded in the middle of two highly corresponding events-
the accomplishment of GATS in 1997 and China's formal entry into the WTO in 2001-
was not a coincidence. Rather, it mirrored both the tremendous pressures that the Chinese
22. Id. at 1179-80.
23. Id. at 1168-69.
24. Id. at 1184.
25. WATO, Negotiation Group on Basic Telecommunications, Reference Paper, Apr. 24, 1996, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/serv-e/telecome/tel2 3_e.htm [hereinafter Reference Paper].
26. Id.
27. The full text of the U.S.-China WTO Market Access Agreement (Section II: Services Commitments)
is available at http://www.uschina.org/public/wto/market/. A summary of the Sino-U.S. bilateral WTO agree-
ment is available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/wto/reaction/summary.html.
28. Id.
29. Gordon G. Chang, Why Trade Will Win, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 15, 1999, at A27.
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government was facing in its challenge to enter the WTO and its willingness and confidence
to adopt unprecedented policies in opening its market and facing the international com-
petition in this sector.
HI. Prospective New Competition Patterns in China after
Its Entry into the WTO
For a very long time, China's policy makers had been very cautious about opening the
information and communication industry. These were thought to be not only highly related
to the nation's security and sovereignty but also among the most sensitive and vulnerable
service sectors, like the financial and legal industries. Therefore, it was believed these should
be opened last and only with adequate precautions.
Taking into consideration the above outlined commitments and concessions that China
made, and in view of the fundamental rules and regulatory principles provided in the GATS,
its AT and the Reference Paper, the new picture of the industry and competition pattern
in China is clear: more market players and investors, both international and domestic;
overall real competition instead of simple price wars; more credible and transparent market
access criteria and regulating mechanisms; and, more independent and efficient regulating
authority/authorities. However, all these possible changes can definitely not happen over-
night. The government's control of balance between economic reform and social stability,
and the effectively proven gradual reform should still be followed. The common method
of market liberalization by privatization of the incumbent operator from being a state-
owned public body to a privately owned entity 0 adopted in many other countries like the
United Kingdom is still far from being a practical possibility in China.
Considering the peculiar situation in China, the following issues that concern the West-
ern observers and investors, such as terms and operating parameters for introducing com-
petition, the degree and timetable to which direct foreign investment is allowed, creation
of and constitutional support for relatively independent regulation; and the removal of non-
tariff trade barriers3' are believed to play a more important role in shaping new competition
patterns and are, hence, worthy of detailed discussions.
A. COMPETITION SAFEGUARDS
Because China is still in a transitional period, moving from a central-planning mechanism
towards a pro-competitive market orientation, it is not surprising that there exists a large
gap between the present reality and the principles in the WTO Reference Paper. China
passed a general Anti-unfair Competition Law in September 1993.32 The law prohibits
price-fixing, prevents predatory pricing, and protects trademarks and patents. Enforce-
ment responsibilities, however, are vaguely assigned to "authorities above the county level,"
and there is still no specialized agency to monitor, interpret, or enforce the provisions of
the law."
30. Yong & Qiankun, suepra note I1, at 4.
31. Ken Zita, Will China Embrace Competition? Foreign Equity in Telecoms Hangs in the Balance, Pacific Tele-
communications Council (Jan. 17, 1998), available at http://web.syr.edu/ztan/KenZita-PTC99.html.
32. Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, enacted by the Standing Committee of the
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Further, before the newly implemented Regulations of Telecommunications of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, there had been no well-established and coherent telecommuni-
cations competition policy to prevent anti-competitive behavior by the dominant operators
associated with MPT, and later II, such as cross-subsidization, which was discouraged in
the Reference Paper and has happened with many provincial subsidiaries of MPT/MII.
Facing new competition in cellular markets from Unicorn, those subsidiaries reduced the
cellular phone calling rates drastically while increasing the rate of international calls (in-
ternational calls are a protected monopoly, and are, thus, more profitable). This shortcom-
ing has also resulted in distorted tariffs and highly concentrated markets and has signifi-
candy blocked the entry of potential foreign competitors.
In the above Regulations newly published in September 2000, the fourth article provides
for principles such as separating the regulating and operating functions, breaking up the
monopoly, encouraging competition and development, publicity, justice and equity. Also,
in the forty-first and forty-second articles, a variety of anti-competitive behaviors and ac-
tions are listed and prohibited, including cross-subsidization.
34
However, similar to the previous rules and regulations along this line, and unlike the
European Community and the United Kingdom, the Regulations still lack well designed,
self-executing and reliable enforcement procedures and mechanisms. 5 In addition, the li-
abilities and punishments stipulated in Articles 70 through 73 against those anti-competitive
actions are still very light. They range from condemnation by the competent regulating
authority to the most severe measures, such as fines (maximum up to one million RMB,
which amounts to approximately U.S.$120,000) or suspension of operations.36
Furthermore, there is still no explicit stipulation in the above Regulations about whether
foreign investors and telecommunications service providers are allowed to take part in the
competition, or under what circumstances and conditions they would be approved to do
so, although the Sino-U.S. Bilateral Agreement on China's entry into the WTO was signed
over a year ago and the commitments that China offered to the WTO Members have
been finalized.
Obviously, along with many other legislative documents in various sectors, all the pre-
vailing laws and regulations in the telecommunications sector that are either obsolete or in
contradiction with the WTO principles or commitments of Chinese government need to
be reviewed and amended thoroughly and completely.
B. INTERCONNECTION
Interconnection is widely regarded as a necessity for telecommunications competition.
The WTO regulatory principles require interconnection with a major supplier at any tech-
nically feasible point in the network upon request. Further, interconnection must be pro-
vided on nondiscriminatory terms, at cost-based rates, with sufficient unbundling so that
competitors need not pay for network components or facilities they do not require."
In the Temporary Regulation on Telecommunications Network Interconnection issued
by MII in 1998, certain basic concepts highlighted in the Reference Paper such as "suffi-
34. Regulations, supra note 14.
35. Yong & Qiankun, supra note 11, at 268.
36. Regulations, supra note 14.
37. Reference Paper, supra note 25.
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ciently unbundl[ing]" were not included."s Although it demonstrates noticeable progress to
issue such a regulation on interconnection, its real effect remains to be seen.
C. UNIVERSAL SERVICES
Members of the agreement have the right to establish universal service obligations but
they must be administered in a transparent, nondiscriminatory, and competitively neutral
manner, and must not be so burdensome as to constitute a barrier to competition.39
In China, the huge geographical region, rough natural conditions, and scanty populations
in vast western areas, as well as the tremendous differences in economic development and
consumption capacity between eastern and western China make the universal service ob-
ligation a burdensome challenge and natural barrier to the newcomers of this market. Thus,
the sole provider of the basic telecommunications service, China Telecom, has inevitably
adopted cross-subsidiaries. How to maintain the basic telecommunications service, for
which a government is held responsible, while discontinuing the long and effective solution
of cross-subsidization, so as to satisfy the WTO principles and also place this obligation
upon the old and new telecom carriers impartially and non-discriminatorily, has become a
big issue before MII, the regulator.
D. LICENSING CRITERIA
According to the Reference Paper, where licenses to operate a service are required, the
country must make publicly available all licensing criteria, as well as the time period re-
quired to reach a decision about a license application. Signatories are also committed to
make the terms and conditions of individual licenses publicly available.40
This is another area that has been fiercely criticized, both domestically and internation-
ally. In fact, China lacks a set of established, practical, and transparent criteria in awarding
the telecommunications license, especially for the national carrier. Most of the licensing
decisions were made at a level even higher than MPT or MI, such as the State Council or
the State Programming and Development Committee (SPDC). Decisions are made polit-
ically, but not economically, and the process lacks transparency and is full of uncertainty.
Setting up such a system is definitely not an easy task, and China still has a long way to go
in this regard.
E. INDEPENDENT REGULATOR
Regulatory bodies should be "separate from, and not accountable to," any supplier of
services. Decisions and procedures of the regulator should be impartial.41
It is always difficult to ensure the independence of a regulatory authority from the gov-
ernment, because essentially the regulator remains a branch of the government and deeply-
rooted in the whole system. In China, the situation is even more complex and puzzling,
mainly because of the following two reasons.
38. Temporary Regulation on Telecommunications Network Interconnection, promulgated by the Ministry of In-
formation Industry of the P.R. China on September 7, 1997, available at http://www.lqi.gov.cn/FLFG/FL/
fbzdjzf.htm. This temporary regulation was abolished by Administrative Regulation on Public Telecommunications
Network Interconnection, promulgated by the Ministry of Information Industry of the P.R. China on May 10,
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First, there is more than one regulator in the market and the entire regulation procedure
and the individual competence and authority of each regulator is either vague or non-
transparent. 42 For example, the MPT, or MII, is usually the sole regulator, but most of the
essential and regulatory decisions like the rounds of institutional restructuring outlined in
the first part of this article, and the final approval of licenses for basic telecommunications
service were actually made by the SPDC and State Council.
Second, reciprocal relations in terms of economics, personnel, and the like existed be-
tween MII and telecom operators. A basic fact is that almost all of the present operators
are state-owned or state-held enterprises (SOE) and differ from private firms pursuing
maximum profits for shareholders in Western countries. In those cases, there is no funda-
mental conflict of interest among the regulators and operators, the competition among
those subsidiary enterprises under such a circumstance was just like competition between
the left hand and right hand of the same person. This fact can explain the failure of the
government's efforts to foster effective competition in the SOEs. Additionally, the key
management staff of most of the operators is still nominated by MII. Transforming to a
market- and profit-oriented company, and bestirred by the possibility of an overseas listing,
may effectively change this practice.
The political reality in China is decidedly that there is less possibility to form an inde-
pendent regulator even after its accession to the VWTO. The Party is still responsible for
making fundamental socioeconomic policy and controlling the political and economic pro-
cess. In addition, the Party holds the power of appointing and removing officials, including
the Minister of MII. It is beyond reasonable imagination and is meaningless that MII would
demand an independent status from the central government, even after China joined the
VTO. On the contrary, like most other countries and following the administrative prin-
ciple, MII must implement the policies, decisions, and tasks directed by the State Council
on behalf of the government.
Actually, the independence required by the Reference Paper should not be interpreted
so narrowly by asking for a complete separation of institution from the government. To
remain a branch of the administration system is a prerequisite of its authority and com-
petence. Hence, we should concentrate more on how to ensure two basic requirements
included in the Reference Paper, specifically " . . . separate from and not accountable to
any supplier . . . " and "... be impartial and nondiscriminatory in dealing with all market
participants."41 As for the situation in China, we may have a clearer picture about the per-
spective in this regard through the lens of a macro view-the political reform that has been
pending since 1989. MII itself cannot be insulated and independent of the entire political and
administrative system. Therefore, we can expect another gradual reform through the efforts
and interaction of MIT and all the present and new market players, by establishing a set of
clear, transparent, and practical rules and procedures, further separating the regulation and
operation of MI, and restructuring the dominant carriers according to contemporary com-
pany law in forming independent and sophisticated operators concurrently.
42. Although some other countries like the United Kingdom also have more than one regulator (OFTEL,
MMC, DTI), their functions and competence are clearly divided by the relevant Act and the regulating pro-
cedure is open and established. Armstrong, supra note 4, at 139.
43. Reference Paper, supra note 25.
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F. STATUS AS DEVELOPING COUNTRY
GATS allows developing countries to ... place reasonable conditions on access to and
use of public telecommunications transport networks and services necessary to strengthen
its domestic telecommunications infrastructure and service capacity."44 Since China's gov-
ernment insisted, and succeeded, on joining the WNTO in the status of a developing country,
with the exception of the explicit timetable set out in the Sino-U.S. bilateral agreement for
China's accession to WTO, the market-opening schedule in other areas of telecommuni-
cations service could accordingly be arranged in a relatively longer time period, consistent
with this very principle of GATS.J-owever, penetration of foreign capital to China's do-
mestic, value-added telecommunications services, data transmission and mobile calls (one
year after entry into the WTO); to basic telecommunications service and basic infrastruc-
ture construction (two years after entry into the WTO); and, to long-distance and inter-
national telecommunications business (four years after entry into the INTO) will be
inevitable, whether through the capital market directly or through setting up of new joint-
ventures or other methods of indirect cooperation with incumbent operators.45
IV. Conclusion
The impact of China's entry into the WTO will be long lasting and enormous. The
VWTO entry will certainly change the landscape, especially the competition patterns of the
telecommunications industry in China. It will prompt the Chinese government to allow
more competition in the industry, and force telecom companies to improve efficiency.
The WTO principles and disciplines do have positive effects in promoting telecommu-
nications liberalization on its members, but the actual progress toward the WTO goals
would display great variations and would mainly depend on the specific institutional char-
acter and regulatory stances of the members. In China's telecommunications sector, the
present conservative regulating system would still play its role for a foreseeable long time,
even at the post-WTO stage. Establishment of a pro-competition regulating system is still
dependant upon on fundamental political and economic reforms.
However, the above observation does not suggest a pessimistic outlook for the new com-
petition patterns of post-WTO China in the telecommunications sector. The door has been
opened and cannot be closed. Also, the commitments that the Chinese government made
to the WTO members are almost impossible to re-contract, withdraw or reconsider. Un-
doubtedly, the Chinese telecommunications sector is now entering a crucial transitional
stage, while simultaneously facing huge challenges and development opportunities.
Like many other sectors in both service and manufacturing in China, a new wave of
development will be realized under the momentum and competitive pressures within the
WTO framework, although pain and suffering is unavoidable at the same time.
The Chinese case has also proved that the transition from a monopoly telecommunica-
tions market to a rather competitive one is not easy, requiring the dedication from the
government to change institutional structures and obsolete legal frameworks, and to watch
over the entire process of competition enhancement. Other emerging economies can share
China's experiences and lessons in this course and explore their own way of succeeding.
44. GATS, supra note 17, at 1169.
45. Splitting of Telecommunications and Compounding of Broadcasting, ECONOMIC OBSERVER DAILY, Jan. 6,2002.
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Annex
Table: The Winners and Losers in the Development of
Telecommunications Industry46 (1990-2000)
Changes in total teledensity rank, between 1990 and 2000, for selected economies
Economies with rising rank
Econmy Rank Rank Change
2000 1990 2000 1990
Chino 17.8 0,6 95 159 64
V.et Nam 4.2 0.1 141 189 48
Bo swana 21.6 2.1 91 129 38
El Soladot 21.8 2.4 90 125 35
Jomoca 34.1 4.5 71 106 35
Hun4ury 67.4 9.6 43 78 35
Mwwrilius 38.6 5.4 67 100 33
Chile 44.4 6.7 61 93 32
Phlippines 12.4 1.0 112 143 31
Moucco 13.3 1.6 107 136 29
Pulaoguay 20.7 2.7 92 120 28
Cumbud.u 1.2 0.0 167 194 27
Cupe Velde 17.2 2.4 98 125 27
Tanon-C hna 137.0 31.4 5 31 26
Poland 456 86 60 85 25
Economies with falling rank
Rank Rank Change
conlom 2000 1990 2000 1990
Armeno 15.6 15.7 102 60 -42
hoq 2.9 3.9 149 109 -40
Taiilustan 3.6 4.5 143 105 -38
Uzbekiisan 6.9 6.9 128 92 -36
Kyrgrzsa  7.9 7.2 125 90 - 35
Angola 0.7 0.8 I1/ 146 -31
Libeiia 0.2 0.4 190 162 -28
UPR KaLea 4.6 3.8 138 11I -27
Canada 96.1 58.6 33 6 - 27
Tunkm .slun 8.4 6.0 123 97 -26
Cubu 4.4 3.1 140 115 -25
Muldvo 16.5 10.6 99 74 -25
KeuaIkhston 12.5 8.0 11I 87 -24
Conmos 10 0.8 171 149 -22
LUoaine 22.7 13.6 87 66 -21
Note: Total teledensity is the sum of fixed lines and mobile users per 100 inhabitants. Some 193 economies
were ranked.
Source: ITU World Telecommunication Indicators Database.
46. Statistics, supra note 3.
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